Statesmanship in a democracy necessarily consists, in part, of the capacity and will to restrain the community’s worst impulses. A democratic people, owing to its engagement in the political process, regularly becomes animated – sometimes to the point of frenzy – by the issues about which it must deliberate. The various passions, as the old books call them, of a democratic people often run directly contrary to even previously agreed-upon standards of justice. Extrajudicial killings – lynchings – testify to this phenomenon most notoriously. The community has previously agreed that punishment for some crime or alleged crime will be determined by a structured judicial process. Yet, faced with the spectacle of what it perceives immediately to be a crime, without due consideration of whether it is, in fact, a crime, the community, in a fit of madness and stimulated by its coalescence into a vanguard of the vengeful, takes matters into its own hands, apprehending and slaying the accused – no trial, no delays. The matter, resolved in complete discordance with established procedures and staining the individual conscience of each member of the mob, is, nevertheless, settled satisfactorily to restore harmony to the community. We note, in passing, that this process is suggestive of Girard’s conception of the skapegoat; an entity whose sacrifice performs the essential function of resolving a tension within a community that otherwise would destroy the community itself.
The defender of the accused, in seeking to bring about a trial of the accused by means of established legal procedures, is also the defender of law – an ultimately rational and civilizing force – against emotion, impulse, and the pure will of the accusers. There can be no civilization without law; it is, however imperfect, the only method to resolve disputes without making an ultimate appeal to force. In political circumstances without rule of law, the strong always dominate the weak. This is not to say that, in political circumstances with rule of law, the strong never dominate the weak; in truth, the majority of time, the strong still do dominate the weak. But in such a system, the weak at least have the possibility of protection and redress. States, in contradistinction from communities or nations, understand themselves as essentially legal entities, whose legitimacy grounded in frameworks that determine the ‘rules of the game’ of political life within them. A nation derives its legitimacy exclusively from its identity; what it is, as opposed to frameworks it has elected to adopt, as in the case of a state. A state can change as the result of conscious decisionmaking; a nation can change only as part of a more general process whereby a new identity is gradually and intuitively assimilated by its members.
The United States of America is a state more than its inhabitants are a nation because the conditions its inhabitants must accept to belong to it are legal in character. The requirements for citizenship are clearly defined; they include nothing about identity or self-identity. They are external insofar as they are, in principle, attainable by any individual. The possession of citizenship is sufficient to be an American.
The tension between what the community seems to collectively desire at a given moment and the restraints on what the community is able to legally do in pursuit of what it desires is frequently observed in American history. One of the most famous examples that comes to mind is John Adams’ defense of the British soldiers involved in the Boston Massacre. Adams determined to defend the soldiers, whom the community, or in any case, the driving elements of the community, desired to lynch. Adams, by successfully defending the soldiers, defended the rule of law as something of greater importance than the outcome of any individual dispute or controversy. He also managed to impose upon an unruly assembly the acceptance of facts that made the persecution of the soldier manifestly unjust. Facts are stubborn things because the community may never fully accept them as true but is compelled, by law, to act as if they are true. In a sense, the law is the mechanism to which the rational person can appeal to impose his rational arguments upon those who may never agree with him on an intellectual basis. It is, often, foolishness to believe people can be won over or persuaded by good arguments and the power of the law functions as an intermediate – but more elevated – step between the extreme positions of accepting the community’s passionate position as the basis for further action and of using pure force to compel the community to accept a version of events contrary to its own.
The summit of statesmanship in a democracy, however, is not, in fact, using the law to force compliance but persuading the community with arguments which appeal to its particular sensibilities. It is very possible to make a good argument that is unpersuasive and a bad argument that is persuasive. This frequently happens with scientific or highly technical topics. The specialist can satisfactorily demonstrate the truth of his position on such and such by furnishing evidence which, from the standpoint of other specialists, is indisputable and yet fail to convince non-specialists – members of the general public – of his position by poorly calibrating or communicating his position. The politician – or the statesman, which is a more highly developed version of the politician – is unconcerned with making the most valid argument and wholly concerned with making the most persuasive one. Importantly, the statesman and specialist can have the same fundamental position on a question; it is the manner in which each presents his position that differs. In a democracy, the passions of the people must be understood so that they may be directed toward constructive ends and away from actions that violate the principles of individual liberty.
The Young Mr. Lincoln, released in 1939 and starring Henry Fonda in the title role, is concerned with these questions. The plot centers around a trial of two young men for murder and presents Lincoln as displaying his well-known characteristics of homely wisdom and wit, shrewd judgment of people, and quiet self-confidence of a man certain in the justice of his cause and of his own abilities to advance that cause. The accused are defended by Lincoln, who, in the scene immediately following that in which the murder occurs, prevents their lynching at the hands of a furious and drunken mob by appealing to the mob in language it can understand, successfully persuading it to disperse. Lincoln comes to get to know the young men’s family and his humanity and sympathy for the poor and helpless is distinctly felt throughout the course of these interactions. We are, perhaps, asked to perceive in this family – the mother of which cannot read or write – the antebellum slave population, which Lincoln would later do so much to defend and safeguard. It is the first act of Lincoln’s great drama – or, perhaps more appropriately, it is the education of Lincoln, a sort of Bildungsroman, in film, of the American statesman.
Much of the film, indeed, foreshadows Lincoln’s later life. He is acquainted with Mary Todd and, at the same time, shown to lack the social graces, which, even once in Washington society, he never acquired. He is portrayed as in competition with Stephen Douglas, who is portrayed, somewhat, as Lincoln’s dandified antithesis, even as Douglas has little actual role in the film’s plot. We are given some sense of Lincoln’s sympathetic position toward the South, which was later reflected in his efforts to restrain the more radical elements of the Republican Party, by his playing of ‘Dixie’ on the strange (to 21st century audiences) instrument known as a mouth organ. His political genius is manifest, but understood to be almost purely the result of natural ability – an intuition for what action, in a particular situation, is not only most effective, but most congruent to his character. It is doubtful that the film has exaggerated these themes beyond due proportion; Lincoln’s achievement, like that of Washington, was the natural outgrowth of who he was as opposed to what he learned to be.
Lincoln’s ultimately successful defense of the young men hinged on his exploitation of a contradiction in the testimony of the key witness. The witness alleged that he was able to observe the murder take place from a great distance because the moon was full and illuminated the struggle between the accused and the victim. A consensus begins to emerge among the trial’s observers – including Douglas, who even issues a statement to the press criticizing Lincoln’s handling of the case – that the men will be convicted and hanged. On the final day, Lincoln, who rejected an offer by the judge the previous night to use his influence to turn the case over to a more experienced lawyer, reveals that the witness’s testimony could not be true because, according to an almanac, the moon was nowhere near full at the time of the murder. The revelation of this fact, acquired by Lincoln through his knowledge of books, in this case an almanac, turns the trial around and enables Lincoln to demonstrate that the witness was, in fact, the murderer.
In a sense, democratic politics – especially in the particularly American system of government – is well-illustrated by the film, beyond the representation of Lincoln as a democratic statesman. The jury is populated by apparently ignorant and easily-impressionable individuals, who are effectively handled by Lincoln’s clever, homely jokes and salt-of-the-earth references. We get the sense that a real injustice was on the verge of being consummated, but for Lincoln; perhaps this suggests the indispensability of good leadership, even in systems which, due to their democratic basis and possession of institutions that check and balance each other, are presumed to not require exceptional leaders.